Abstract. I use a panel of US manufacturing industries to test how venture capital (VC) affects the size distribution of business firms. The estimates suggest that an increase in the supply of VC affects positively mean firm size by increasing the relative share of mediumsized and larger firms. These results are robust to specifications that address the endogeneity in the supply of VC. The empirical evidence is consistent with the idea that VC promotes the "elitization" of firm entry.
Introduction
The USA is a dynamic entrepreneurial economy, with an average of 700,000 new firms started each year (representing a rate of new business creation of around 12%), and with the turnover among industry leaders increasing from 10% to 20% between 1980 and 2000.
1 However, entrepreneurial firm dynamics varies tremendously even across otherwise similar states. For example, in 2000, at the peak of the dot-com bubble, 75.9% of the establishments in the District of Columbia had fewer than twenty employees, while across the border, in Virginia, 86.1% of the firms did. And while the average firm in Wyoming had eleven employees, a firm in adjacent Utah employed on average twenty workers. 2 * I thank an anonymous referee, Laura Bottazzi (2nd ESSEC Private Equity Chair Conference discussant), Thomas Chemmanur, Ali Hortacsu, Christian Keuschnigg, Luc Laeven, Josh Lerner, Ross Levine, Elena Loutskina, Holger Muller (the editor), Phil Strahan, and Vijay Yerramilli for helpful comments, as well as seminar participants at the 2009 European Economic Association meeting in Barcelona, the University of St Gallen, and the 2nd ESSEC Private Equity Chair Conference. I thank Masako Ueda for sharing with me her concordance code and Vladimir Ivanov for generously providing me with the VentureXpert data. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the European Central Bank or the Eurosystem. 1 See Comin and Philippon (2005) and Stangler and Kedrosky (2010) It is tempting to hypothesize that part of these differences can be attributed to geographic variations in the availability of entrepreneurial finance. The US boasts the most developed and sophisticated venture capital (VC) industry in the world, but there are large regional variations, with venture capitalists very active in Massachusetts and California and virtually absent from Alaska or Hawaii. And while there is strong evidence on the contribution of VC to the birth (Samila and Sorenson, 2011) and survival (Puri and Zarutskie, 2012) of new companies, there has been no systematic study of the effect of VC on the substantial variation in entrepreneurial firm dynamics across states.
My article goes to the heart of this question by studying the impact of VC on well-defined measures of industry structure in US local markets between 1992 and 2001. More precisely, I investigate how average firm size and the skewness of the firm size distribution have evolved in industries and states where venture capitalists have been active relative to industries and states that venture capitalists have largely ignored. The firm size distribution is an important determinant of market performance and economic growth. For example, the skewness of the firm size distribution can explain a large part of the cross-market variation in job creation or per-worker income (Davis and Haltiwanger, 1992; Alfaro, Charlton, and Kanczuk, 2008) . Linking in a convincing fashion entrepreneurial finance to the distribution of firm sizes can therefore help clarify some of the channels through which financial markets affect various macroeconomic outcomes.
My results suggest that higher VC investment is associated with an increase in mean firm size, driven by an increase in the relative share of medium-sized and larger firms. The contribution of my article is thus to show that as a result of the increase in VC funding, the firm size distribution has become less positively skewed, potentially due to the entry and survival of larger VC-backed projects. Alternatively, VC termination of poorly performing projects may deter the entry of low-quality firms, resulting in a lower share of small firms in VC-intensive industries. This evidence points to important differences, in the sense of aggregate consequences, between bank credit and VC finance. Unlike bank competition, which evidence suggests has resulted in higher entry rates of and higher churning rates among very small firms (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009) , VC seems to affect, in the aggregate, mostly the middle and the right tail of the firm size distribution. By screening to pick the highest quality projects, monitoring their development over time, and helping the companies they finance establish themselves in the marketplace, venture capitalists seem to have slowed down an otherwise secular decline in firm size during the 1990s. Unlike the US bank branching reforms, which led to a "democratization" of the general entrepreneurial process (Kerr and Nanda, 2009) , venture capitalists seem to promote the "elitization" of entry by picking and nurturing firms with a high probability of success in the marketplace.
There are endemic problems associated with identifying the causal effect of VC on real economic activity, which I try to deal with carefully. For one, both the structure of industrial sectors and VC activity may be driven by a common, potentially unobservable factor. For instance, a greater availability of specialized human capital may have increased VC investment efficiency and at the same time exerted an independent effect on the industry structure through a better allocation of capital to entrepreneurial talent. Alternatively, demand for VC funds may be higher in industries that exhibit higher business churn for technological reasons or in markets populated by larger and more efficient firms. I address these simultaneity issues in two different ways. First, I employ a fixed effects panel estimation strategy that allows me to net out the effect of unobservable factors at the state-sector level. Second, I use the size of state and local pension funds together with the structural break induced by a policy innovation opening the door to pension funds to invest in risk capital 3 as instruments to identify the supply of VC. In addition to that, I vary the empirical methodology in order to account for errors-invariables induced by the fluctuating nature of VC investment and for the highly skewed distribution of VC investment across states and industries, among others. I also account for the possibility that VC may have a relatively slow effect on the industry structure. The overall results remain qualitatively robust to all alternative specifications.
The article relates to three main lines of empirical literature. First, various researchers have sought to link general financial development to the firm size distribution. For example, Kumar, Rajan, and Zingales (1999) find that the median firm in sectors dependent on external finance tends to be larger in countries with more efficient financial systems. Cabral and Mata (2003) study the evolution of the firm size distribution in a sample of Portuguese manufacturing firms and show that financial constraints can be linked to the fact that the distribution of older firms is more symmetric than the distribution of younger firms (Cooley and Quadrini, 2001 , offer a formal theoretical treatment). However, recently Angelini and Generale (2008) have questioned this result, providing evidence that financial frictions exert little effect on the firm size distribution in developed economies.
Second, recent empirical research has sought to link VC involvement with firm growth. For example, Hellmann and Puri (2000) show that VC-backed firms hire more workers, controlling for firm age and industry. Bottazzi and Da Rin (2002) find that VC is effective in helping firms overcome credit constraints, be born in the first place, and grow faster conditional on entry.
Finally, my article adds to a remarkably limited research on the effects of VC on aggregate economic growth, rather than on firm-level performance. Among the few studies on the subject, Kortum and Lerner (2000) and Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) show that VC investment in the USA is associated with more innovation as measured by patent counts and patent citations at the industry level.
Mine is the first study to explore the effect of VC on the overall firm size distribution. This is crucial as it goes to the heart of policies aimed at improving economic efficiency. For example, VC has been shown to bring to the marketplace new firms in possession of disruptively innovative ideas, both in the USA and Europe (Popov and Roosenboom, 2009; Samila and Sorenson, 2011) . However, the effect of this process on the full firm size distribution is unknown. It is therefore essential to provide knowledge on whether it is indeed the superior ideas that quickly benefit from VC finance to become full-blown companies or if VC simply increases churning at the left tail of the firm size distribution. In addition, it is important to know whether this development is equally strong in "old" and "new" industries. By observing the firm size distribution development at the industry level, I am able to answer the above questions by distinguishing more traditional industries from those at the forefront of technological progress.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the theoretical links between VC and the firm size distribution. Section 3 describes the data used in the analysis. In Section 4, I discuss the empirical model. Section 5 reports the results from the main models and from exercises designed to address various endogeneity and robustness issues. Section 6 concludes with the main findings of the article.
VC and Industry Structure: Theoretical Arguments
What is the effect of VC finance on the firm size distribution in non-financial industries? To begin with, financial constraints tend to play a significant role in firms' investment decisions (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen, 1988) , and this is particularly true for young firms. Evans and Jovanovic (1989) present a model of entrepreneurial choice under liquidity constraints whose main prediction is a positive correlation between access to finance and the rate of new business creation. Cooley and Quadrini (2001) , Cabral and Mata (2003) , and Albuquerque and Hopenhayn (2004) put forth theories that use financial constraints to generate scale dependence or rates of growth and exit rates declining with establishment size. In these theories, the relaxation of financial constraints is systematically reflected in the size distribution of establishments by allowing young firms to grow faster and challenge established incumbents. King and Levine (1993) develop a model in which financial intermediaries screen potential entrepreneurs and mobilize resources to finance the most promising investment projects, improving the probability of successful innovation and accelerating economic growth. The practical implication of these theories is that a more efficient financial system should increase the positive skewness of the firm size distribution by improving the survival chances of small young firms and ensuring that the largest and most viable projects receive funding.
Although credit markets have inspired a host of empirical tests of these theoretical predictions (Cetorelli, 2004; Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) , banks are often reluctant to finance small young firms because of high uncertainty, information asymmetries, and agency costs (Beck, Demirguc-Kunt, and Maksimovic, 2004) . In comparison, venture capitalists are specialized to overcome these problems through the use of staged financing, private contracting, and active monitoring (Hellmann, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2001; Casamatta and Haritchabalet, 2007) and are therefore more likely to finance early stage and technology companies. In general, there are three main mechanisms suggested by the literature through which VC should lead to higher rates of new business creation. First, venture capitalists may directly assist the birth of new firms through, for example, seed capital. Hellmann and Puri (2000) show that VC-backed firms have a significantly higher probability of bringing an actual product to the marketplace than non-VC-backed firms. Chemmanur, Krishnan, and Nandy (2011) show that the efficiency of VC-backed firms relative to non-VC-backed firms is higher before VC involvement and increases further after that, implying both a screening and a monitoring effect. Keuschnigg (2004) develops a model in which the entrepreneur's own wealth constitutes a binding constraint, and so venture capitalists stimulate new business creation by ensuring that good ideas receive funding even when conceived by entrepreneurs without substantial assets. Second, nascent entrepreneurs may recognize the need for capital in the future and only establish firms when they have reasonably high expectations of obtaining such funding. This implies that not just seed capital but later financing stages, like start-up and expansion finance, should matter too for firm entry (Samila and Sorenson, 2011) . Third, firms may be engaged in "entrepreneurial spawning" or spin-offs. Gompers, Lerner, and Scharfstein (2005) show that younger public firms located in main hubs of VC activity are the ones most likely to create new ventures. Sevilir (2010) develops a model in which the availability of new firm financing through VC makes it more desirable for employees to exert effort, generate a new business idea, and ultimately start their own firm. Alternatively, new firms may be established by existing corporations themselves. Fulghieri and Sevilir (2009) argue that when the competition to innovate intensifies, firms move from internal to external organization of projects to increase the speed of product innovation and obtain a competitive advantage with respect to rival firms in their industry.
In addition to linking VC finance to new business creation, the literature has made predictions about the effect of VC on equilibrium firm size. Early field research by Sahlman (1990) suggested that the value of VC lies in providing not only money but also ancillary services, such as selecting good firms and "professionalizing" companies. This argument has two subpoints. For one, venture capitalists can screen firms better than banks and consequently take on larger but riskier projects. For example, in Ueda (2004) firms choose the type of finance based on the tradeoff between technological expertise and the risk of expropriation, whereby larger projects are financed by VC and VC-backed projects achieve faster growth. In Winton and Yerramilli (2008) , there is a tradeoff between VC expertise and the higher return demanded by venture capitalist to compensate for the liquidity restrictions imposed by VC funds on their investors. Their model yields similar predictions in that in equilibrium, venture capitalists end up financing larger projects than banks. 5 To the extent that such large but risky projects may not have been selected for financing by banks in the first place, VC should then be associated with the entry in product markets of potentially larger firms. Puri and Zarutskie (2012) provide some support for this conjecture by demonstrating that venture capitalists invest in firms with large scale.
For two, venture capitalists provide value-added services by mentoring entrepreneurs, hiring executives, formulating strategies, and helping the companies they finance establish themselves in the marketplace. In particular, Berlin (1998) argues that venture capitalists work in close collaboration with the stock market to take the firms they fund public. Kaplan and Stromberg (2001) suggest that venture capitalists not only screen companies but also actively monitor them over time, improving their market strategy. Hellmann and Puri (2002) argue that venture capitalists play an active role in helping their portfolio companies recruit professional CEOs and skilled workers at various hierarchy levels. The immediate implications for the firm size distribution of these arguments are that VC does not simply create companies, but it results in larger companies in equilibrium.
Data Sources
Empirically putting these ideas to the test requires data on VC investment and well-defined measures of the firm size distribution over time. Below, I describe the data used in this study.
INDUSTRY STRUCTURE
Data on manufacturing establishments are available at a disaggregated state-industry level on an annual basis from the County Business Patterns, which is an annual survey by the Census Bureau. The same source of data on establishments is used by Cetorelli and Strahan (2006) . Their analysis runs until 1994 because they study the effect of banking deregulation which was completed by the early 1990s. I extend the sample period to 2001 in order to capture a full VC cycle. 6 The data set provides information about the number of establishments, in each state-industry-year, by nine size classes ranging from the "1-5 employees" size class to the "1000þ employees" size class. This level of establishment size disaggregation provides me with an opportunity to observe the evolution of industry structure in local US markets over a relatively long period of time. Furthermore, disaggregation by industry code or geography creates substantial difficulties with missing values (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) , and so I choose to focus on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes in terms of industry disaggregation and on the state level in terms of geographical disaggregation.
Given that the focus of the study is to test predictions about the evolution of industry structure, I use the original data to compute four main variables. The first variable is mean firm size, defined as total employment divided by total number of establishments in each industry-state-year. I next define three variables that capture the share of small, medium, and large establishments. The variable "Share of establishments with 1-19 employees" is defined as the number of establishments in the size classes "1-4 employees," "5-9 employees," and "10-19 employees" in a particular state-industry-year divided by all establishments in that state-industry-year. The variable "Share of establishments with 20-99 employees" is defined as the number of establishments in the size classes "20-49 employees" and "50-99 employees" in a particular state-industry-year divided by all establishments in that state-industry-year. Finally, the variable "Share of establishments with 100þ employees" is defined as the number of establishments in the size classes "100-249 employees," "250-499 employees," "500-999 employees," and "1000þ employees" in a particular state-industry-year divided by all establishments in that state-industry-year. This classification is broadly consistent with how small firms are usually defined in the literature (e.g., Beck et al., 2008) . Whenever possible, I impute missing observations on the number of establishments in a particular size bin from the data on total establishments and the number of establishments in the remaining bins.
Finally, although the number of establishments and the number of firms are not perfectly correlated, the correlation over the period has been very close to 1 in recent years: for example, in 2001, 94% of the US firms (measured using Internal Revenue Service-issued Employer Identification Numbers) had a single establishment. 7 The size distribution of establishments should therefore be a valid empirical analog of the firm size distribution.
VC INVESTMENT
The VC investment data come from Thomson VentureXpert. VC investments include seed/start-up, development, early, balanced, expansion and later stage investments. By definition, they exclude buyouts, mezzanine financing, turnaround financing, distressed debt investments, and other private equity investments by secondary funds and fund of funds. The Thomson VentureXpert database contains information for all VC deals realized, by state and industry class, from 1960 on. I download data on all deals recorded in the database. The original VentureXpert data contain information about deal value, in millions of current USD, as well as each portfolio company's industry affiliation codes.
I focus on the period from 1992 to 2001 for two practical reasons. First, the historical accuracy of VentureXpert's data is much higher in the 1990s than prior to that. Second, my instrumental variable (IV) strategy is based on an instrument derived from the size of state-level pension funds. In 1979, the US Department of Labor clarified that investments in VC funds by pension funds do not violate the prudent man rule in the ERISA (see Gompers and Lerner, 1999, for details) . Partially as a result of this policy shift, investment in new VC funds increased 10-fold over the next decade, and by 1986 pension funds accounted for more than half of all contributions (see Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . Presumably, then, state-level variation in state and municipal pension funds would serve as a good supply shifter for VC investment at the state-industry level. However, these data are only publicly available from the US Census Bureau after 1992, so I use this year as the starting point of my analysis.
CONCORDANCE KEY
One complication involved in combining the County Business Patterns database and VentureXpert is industry concordance. County Business Patterns uses two-digit SIC to code industries up to 1997 and two-digit North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) to code industries from 1998 to 2001, and VentureXpert records the primary four-digit SIC codes of the VC-financed companies. Consequently, I need a concordance key that can convert the three industry classifications into a common one.
I start by converting the VentureXpert data into the Kortum-Lerner manufacturing classes using the concordance procedure developed in Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) . Although the four-digit SIC code is well recorded until 1992 (84% of the 25,328 VC deals between 1965 and 1992 record this information), only 9.9% of the 42,003 VC deals between 1993 and 2001 record the primary SIC code. Instead of SIC codes, VentureXpert uses its own proprietary industry classification system, the Venture Economics Industry Code (VEIC). There is no missing record for this VEIC variable. However, a single industry in VEIC may consist of more than one industry in SIC and vice versa. In addition, differences in terminology across the two databases add another difficulty: for instance, a firm classified in "Biotech Related Fine Chemicals" (VEIC 4311) may belong to "Chemicals and allied products" (SIC two-digit, 28) or "Research, development, and testing services (except noncommercial research organizations)" (SIC three-digit, 873).
To facilitate convergence, Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) use the classification employed by Kortum and Lerner (2000) who aggregate three-digit level SIC industries into twenty industries. To construct VC investment data along the Kortum and Lerner classification, first the missing records of SIC are filled using the SDC Platinum Global New Issue and CRSP through CUSIP match. Next, D&B Million Dollar Database and the business description written in VentureXpert are used to fill in missing SIC codes. Finally, for deals with recorded SIC codes, VC investment is aggregated into a Kortum and Lerner classification code using the concordance given in Table I . For deals for which SIC codes are not recorded, the recorded VEIC is used to distribute the investment amount into SIC-based industries. The distribution rule is constructed from the data records with SIC codes and thereby Kortum-Lerner classification assigned in the way described above. For each VEIC, the distribution of investment amount over Kortum and Lerner classification codes is obtained and used for assigning Kortum and Lerner classification codes to each VC deal without SIC codes. Finally, Kortum and Lerner industries that correspond to three-digit SIC classes are merged into two-digit SIC classes, to facilitate matching to the County Business Patterns database, and all relevant information is aggregated.
Next, I convert the NAICS industries from the 1998-2001 County Business Patterns into a classification that can be matched to SIC without loss of information. This procedure involved the merging of several sets of industries. For example, the various four-digit subgroups of NAICS code 333 correspond both to SIC two-digit codes 35 and 36; the various four-digit subgroups of NAICS code 334 correspond to SIC two-digit codes 35, 36, and 38; and all four-digit subgroups of NAICS code 335 corresponds to SIC twodigit code 36. Consequently, NAICS codes 333-335 are merged into one class and matched to the SIC class resulting from the merging of SIC codes 35, 36, and 38. Analogically, NAICS codes 311, 312, 316, 323, and 339 are merged into one class and matched to an aggregate SIC class comprised by SIC codes 20, 21, 27, 31, and 39. This procedure guarantees that I do not lose information through imperfect matching.
This matching procedure across three separate industry classification results in twelve final industries (Table I) . Although this number is lower than the original twenty SIC/NAICS/Kortum and Lerner industries, it represents the highest number of sectors into which data across all three industrial classifications can be matched without any loss of information. Tables II-IV give descriptive statistics of the main variables of interest across years, states, and industries. Looking at industry structure, the average establishment has 59.50 workers and mean establishment size declined Table I . Industry conversion key: Kortum-Lerner, SIC, and NAICS This table presents the conversion key used in the paper to match SIC, NAICS, and "Kortum-Lerner" industrial specifications.
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
"Kortum-Lerner industry" refers to the industrial specification employed in Kortum and Lerner (2000) . (Table II) . There are, however, substantial differences across states and industries. For example, mean manufacturing establishment size is over the period six times larger in Virginia than in Hawaii (90.65 versus 15.38); almost 90% of all establishments in Alaska have fewer than twenty employees, whereas only slightly more than half of all establishments in Indiana do; and only 5% of all establishments in Wyoming are large compared to almost a quarter of establishments in Kentucky (Table III) . Large differences persist at the industry level too. The average establishment in Industry 4, "Paper," is 5.5 times bigger than the average establishment in Industry 3, "Lumber and furniture" (114.82 versus 21.04). These differences are reflected in the relative shares of small, medium, and large firms: while 79.43% of the firms in "Lumber and furniture" have between 1 and 19 employees and only 4.4% have more than 100 employees, in "Paper" small, medium, and large establishments take up around a third each (Table IV) . Also, it is easy to see that VC disbursements are clustered along all three dimensions. For example, 79% of all VC investment over the period, in constant 2001 dollars, is realized between 1999 and 2001 (Table II) . Also, California and Massachusetts account for roughly half of all VC investment at any point in time (Table III) . Finally, Industry 11-Office and computing machines, other nonelectrical machinery, communication and electronics, other electrical equipment, professional and scientific instruments-accounts for around three-quarters (74.1%) of total VC investment over the period (Table IV) . Table II in particular shows the growth pattern of VC investment in the US manufacturing industry over the two decades before the burst of the dotcome bubble. The amount of investment in 2000 was thirty-three times as much (in real terms) as the one mere 8 years earlier. Part of this increase was due to a sequence of regulatory changes favorable to VC. These changes involve the already mentioned clarification of ERISA's prudent man rule in 1979, the reduction of capital gains tax rate (Gompers and Lerner, 1999) , and the introduction of Bayh-Dole Act 8 that facilitated technology transfers from the universities to the private sectors. However, the whole VC industry experienced a downturn in the early 1990s due to asset quality problems of pension funds. Those funds were pulled out from private equity investments to reduce riskiness of their portfolios. With pension funds being the main financing sources for US venture capitalists, this asset reallocation by pension funds severely hits the ability of venture capitalists to invest. Overall, the VC data are almost identical to the data used by Hirukawa and Ueda (2008) for the period in question (see their Table 3 ).
It is also instructive to eyeball the evolution of the industry structure over time, in terms of industry-specific VC investment (Table IV) . As panels A-D show, average establishment size either declined or stayed constant in all industries, except for the most VC-intensive Industry 11. Average establishment size in Industry 11 increases in a mere 10 years by almost 50% (from 48.36 to 71.55). This development is driven by a decline in the share of small establishments from 71% to 61% accompanied by an increase in the share of medium establishments by almost 25% and an increase in the share of large establishments by more than 50%.
Empirical Model and Identification Strategy
I use the underlying data to estimate the effect of VC investment on various characteristics of the firm size distribution in a fixed effects model, as follows:
where in separate regressions Y ijt equals the natural logarithm of mean firm size or the share of small, medium, or large establishments in state i in industry j during year t. Although not exhaustive in fully describing the firm size distribution, mean establishment size and the distribution of firms across size bins suggest themselves as a necessary set of characteristics to study, given the prediction of theoretical models described in Section 2 as well as various empirical regularities observed in practice (e.g., De Wit, 2005) . Log VC ijt denotes the logarithm of total VC investment in state i in industry j during year t.
Industry j's share of total manufacturing employment in state i during year t (Employment share ijt ) controls for the relative importance of a given sector in the market. Studies of cross-sector industrial growth consistently predict that sectors that have already grown fast in the past grow less in the future (Rajan and Zingales, 1998) and have on average larger firms (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006) . In addition, theories of the industry's life cycle predict that sectors that are already relatively large should have lower rates of new business incorporation (Klepper, 1996) . Alternatively, firms' ability to take up new business opportunities increases with the number of opportunities already exploited (Bottazzi and Secchi, 2006) . Hence, the share variable included in the regression should capture the different propensity to entry and growth due to life-cycle-specific reasons.
É ij is a matrix of state-industry indicator variables controlling for any state-industry-specific, time-invariant effects on industry structure. This is enormously important due to the very nature of VC funding that is specific to a particular sector in a particular locale (e.g., Silicon Valley semiconductors or Massachusetts biotech). I also include a matrix of year fixed effects È t to account for any time-varying effects that may affect the industry structure and which are common across industries and states, such as a change in the tax code. Finally, " ijt is the idiosyncratic error.
Albeit parsimonious, the empirical model has the important advantage that the fixed effects matrices control for time-variant differences in firm size due to unexplained factors that differ across states and industries. For example, anti-trust law may prevent firms from growing too big due to competition considerations, or corporate taxes and environmental regulations may be discouraging firms from entering. The procedure also controls for the business cycle. However, I still need to worry about omitted variable bias and reversed causality at the state-industry-year level. I explain in detail how I deal with this problem in the next section.
Results
In this section, I discuss the empirical estimates from the main model as well as from extensions designed to address various endogeneity and robustness issues. Table V presents the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression results for the log of the number of establishments and the respective shares of small, Table V . VC investment and industry structure: OLS This table reports coefficients from a fixed effects OLS regression, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the average number of workers per establishment in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Mean establishment size"), the share of establishments with between 1 and 19 employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 1-19 employees"), the share of establishments with between 20 and 99 employees in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 20-99 employees"), the share of establishments with 100 or more employees in a particular stateindustry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 100 or more employees"), and the natural logarithm of the total number of establishments in a particular state-industry-year (column labeled "Log total establishments"). Data on establishments come from the County Business Patterns, 1992-2001. Data coded in SIC for the 1992-1997 period and in NAICS for the 1998-2001 period; all data are therefore converted into a SIC-NAICS industrial classification (see Table I for details). Data withheld for confidentiality purposes are reported as "0" in the original file, and are consequently treated as missing observations. "Log VC" is the logarithm of VC investment in a particular state-industry-year. Data on VC investment come from VentureXpert, 1992-2001, and are in constant 2001 dollars. "Industry share of employment" equals the total employment in a given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year. Standard errors, clustered by state-industry, appear below each coefficient in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
VC AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE: MAIN RESULT
(1) The reported estimates imply that an increase in VC funding is associated with a within-state-industry increase in mean establishment size (Column (1)) driven by an increase in the relative share of medium-sized firms (Column (3)). However, while the latter result is statistically significant, the former is not. The results suggest that while VC may spur the entry of new firms, both directly and due to anticipatory effects (Samila and Sorenson, 2011) , the main action at the level of aggregate industry structure is not in the small firms segment. On the contrary, the share of small firms appears to decline as a result of VC activity (Column (2)). The data thus provide tentative support to the hypotheses outlined earlier relating the relative advantage of VC-type finance to the survival and growth of larger "projects" with a higher probability of success.
My data also allow me to translate these effects into absolute numbers. The average VC disbursement over the sample period in a unit of observation-the state-industry-was $5.2 million, corresponding to two VCfinanced firms. There are, on average, 583 establishments in each stateindustry at each point in time, out of which roughly 147 are medium-sized (i.e., have between twenty and ninety-nine employees). The OLS coefficient of 0.021 implies that the funding of one company appears to have increased the number of establishments in the medium-sized category by roughly two establishments.
In Columns (5-7), I repeat the tests from Columns (2 to 4) with a different matrix of fixed effects, namely, state Â year and industry Â year fixed effects. Unlike my preferred specification, these control for time trends that are common across states and industries, but do not control unobservable effects that are fixed at the level of the state-sector. Once I no longer control for the latter, the significance of the effect of VC on the middle points of the industry structure disappears.
Finally, in Column (8), I relate VC to the total number of firms and find the effect to be negative and significant. Although the results in Samila and Sorenson (2011) appear to imply that VC should increase, not decrease, the equilibrium number of firms in the economy, there are reasons to also expect the opposite to happen. For example, VC-backed firms may quickly adopt a monopoly-like position, causing competitors at the lower end of the firm size distribution to exit faster, or deterring them from entry altogether. My data provide tentative evidence for such alternative mechanisms.
Regarding the other main control variable, the industry employment share has a sizeable effect on the industry firm size distribution. For instance, there are roughly six fewer medium-sized establishments in an industry that is at the 75th percentile of manufacturing employment share (i.e., it employs 11.8% of all manufacturing employees in the state) than in an industry that is at the 25th percentile of employment share (i.e., it employs 2.7% of all manufacturing employees in the state).
ADDRESSING THE ENDOGENEITY OF VC INVESTMENT
Although the model eliminates the effect of time-invariant unobservables at the state-sector level and time-varying unobservables common to states and sectors, the possibility still remains that the results are biased by unobservables or reversed causality at the state-industry-year unit of observation. For example, markets that are away from knowledge networks may have little supply of ideas attractive to VC investors. Such markets will tend to rely more on low-tech industries and attract lower VC disbursements. Finding a positive association between VC investment and larger firms across states and industries could simply be picking up this market characteristic. Also, the positive correlation between VC and the total number of firms may be driven by the fact that venture capitalists are attracted to more dynamic states-industries where the returns to entrepreneurship are higher. Venture capitalists choosing a region where to locate their offices would presumably find places with more firms per capita more attractive (Samila and Sorenson, 2011) .
In order to address these endogeneity concerns, I need to use a variable that is correlated with VC finance but uncorrelated with unobservable stateindustry shocks, and then use it in instrumental variables context with fixed effects. In other words, I need to pursue identification by exploiting exogenous variations across states and industries in the supply of VC finance. I use one such supply shifter suggested by the literature (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) , namely, the size of state and local pension funds assets. As pointed out in Gompers and Lerner (1999) , the 1979 clarification of the ERISA by the US Department of Labor led to a five-fold increase in VC investment in the next two decades. State law also requires pension funds to invest in risk capital markets for diversification purposes. How much they would invest in reality is of course a function of their size. Therefore, the size of total pension funds assets is an ideal instrument as it is correlated with VC finance but not with technological opportunities (Kortum and Lerner, 2000; Mollica and Zingales, 2008) . I am not quite done yet, because the size of state and local pensions should have a differential effect across industries. VC investment in states with large pension funds will increase relatively more in industries that are naturally more sensitive to VC investment. I can therefore look at how attractive industries were to venture capitalists before the 1979 ERISA policy shift. Industries with high levels of VC investment before the policy change should experience a greater increase in VC funding in states with larger pension funds. This will be especially true in the case of industry specialization of individual venture capitalists (Kortum and Lerner, 2000) . Therefore, the level of VC financing prior to the policy shift, interacted with the logarithm of the size of current state and local pension funds assets, is an appropriate instrument for current VC investment at the state-industry-year unit of observation.
I proceed to collect data on the size of assets of state and local pension funds from the State and Local Government Employee Retirement Systems survey of the US Business Census. The survey covers the period 1992-2007. 9 Next, I collect VC data for the 5-year period [1975] [1976] [1977] [1978] [1979] , which proxies for the industry's attractiveness to venture capitalists, uncontaminated by the later increase in VC funding due to the 1979 policy shift. I then interact this variable with the average of the logarithm of state and local pension fund assets for each year after 1992. The predetermined component of the industry's sensitivity to VC investment, interacted with a VC supply shifter at the state level, should eliminate the endogenous element of contemporaneous VC investment.
Instrumental variables can reduce dramatically the bias in the OLS estimates when simultaneity is present, but only if they are strongly correlated with the explanatory variable of interest (relevance condition) and if they do not affect the independent variable directly or through other channels, and so they can be excluded from the second stage (exclusion restriction). The estimates from the first stage, in which I test the relevance condition, are reported in Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) of Table VI. The results are encouraging: in all cases, the sign of the coefficient on pension funds size is positive and the effect is significant at the 1% statistical level. The Fstatistics in all four cases is higher than the critical value required for the IV estimates to have no more than 10% of the bias of the OLS estimates (see Stock and Yogo, 2005) .
The estimates from the second-stage regression are reported in Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) of Table VI. The natural logarithm of VC investment is instrumented using industry VC sensitivity interacted with the natural 9 Some idea of the development of state pension funds over time is given in Table II . Table I for details). Data withheld for confidentiality purposes are reported as "0" in the original file, and are consequently treated as missing observations. "Log VC" is the logarithm of VC investment in a particular state-industry-year. Data on VC investment come from VentureXpert, 1992 VentureXpert, -2001 , and are in constant 2001 dollars. "Industry share of employment" equals the total employment in a given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year. "Log PF assets" is the logarithm of pension fund assets in a particular state in a particular year. "Pre-1979 VC" is the average of the log of VC investment in a particular industry-state between 1975 and 1979. Columns (1), (3), (5), and (7) report first-stage regressions of "Log VC" on "Log PF assets Â Pre-1979 VC". Columns (2), (4), (6), and (8) report estimates from second-stage regressions where "Log VC"
has been instrumented using "Log PF assets Â Pre-1979 VC". Standard errors, clustered by state-industry, appear below each coefficient in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
(1) logarithm of state and local pensions funds assets. The first thing to notice is that the effect of VC on mean establishment size is not only positive but also significant at the 1% level (Column (2)). The magnitude of the effect implies that a doubling of VC funding results in an increase in mean establishment size by 3.2%, or by two workers. In addition to that, the share of small firms (with fewer than nineteen employees) declines (Column (4)), and the share of firms with between twenty and ninety-nine workers increases (Column (6)), in industry-states with a high volume of VC funding. Both effects are significant, the former at the 1% statistical level. VC funding and the share of very large firms are also positively correlated (Column (8)), and significantly so as well. In all cases, the coefficients produced by the IV procedure are higher than the OLS ones, but not unreasonably so. For instance, in the case of the effect of VC on the share of establishments with twenty to ninety-nine workers, the IV coefficient is about twelve times larger than the OLS coefficient (0.254 in Table VI , Column 6 versus 0.021 in Table V , Column 3). The estimates from this 2 SLS procedure clearly continue to imply that higher VC investment is mapped over time into a less positively skewed firm size distribution. This effect derives from an increase in the relative share of medium-sized and larger firms and a decline in the relative share of small firms. Thus, the evidence in Tables V and VI suggests important differences, in the sense of aggregate consequences, between bank credit and VC finance. Although bank competition and bank sector reforms mostly affect very small firms (Cetorelli and Strahan, 2006; Kerr and Nanda, 2009) , VC seems to affect, in the aggregate, mostly the middle and in the right tail of the firm size distribution. For example, evidence suggests that bank deregulation "democratized" entry by allowing more small firms to enter, after which the forces of Schumpeterian creative destruction determine tomorrow's winners (Kerr and Nanda, 2009 ). In comparison, venture capitalists seem to promote the "elitization" of entry. By investing in high-quality projects, monitoring their development over time, and helping the companies they finance establish themselves in the marketplace; venture capitalists appear to have slowed down an otherwise secular decline in firm size during the 1990s.
As mentioned already, the IV estimates are larger than the OLS ones. One potential explanation for why the OLS estimate is downward bias is selection, if venture capitalists tend to invest in state-industries where the share of medium-sized firms is lower on average. The data seem to support this conjecture: for example, the average share of medium-sized firms in Industry 11 (by far the largest recipient of VC investment) is 0.22, whereas in the remaining industries it is on average 0.26. Similarly, 68% of all establishments in Industry 11 are small (less than twenty employees), relative to 62% in the rest of the economy. This implies that VC investment is positively correlated to how left-skewed the firm size distribution is, accounting for the downward bias of the OLS effect.
DATA ROBUSTNESS: EXCLUDING OUTLIER STATES AND INDUSTRIES
I next perform a data robustness check in which I test for the degree to which my estimates so far are driven by states and industries with "too much" or "too little" VC investment. This test is inspired by the large dispersion in VC investment across states and industries captured in Tables III and IV . As already mentioned, California and Massachusetts account for roughly half of all VC investment at any point in time during the sample period, with an average VC-to-Gross State Product ratio over the sample period of more than 0.1% (0.17 and 0.14%, respectively). At the same time, two states, Alaska and Hawaii, command an average VC-to-Gross State Product ratio over the sample period of less than 0.001%.
Panel A of Table VII repeats the main regressions, both for the OLS and the 2SLS specification, after excluding these four states. Although the results become statistically somewhat less consistent, the main pattern suggested by the data continues to hold: average firm size increases in state-industries with high levels of VC activity, and the share of medium-size, as well as of larger (in the 2SLS specification only), firms increases at the expense of the share of small firms.
The second test deals with industry outliers. The original twenty Kortum and Lerner industries allow for a finer spread of VC investment across industries that are of interest to VC. For example, in their classification "Office and computing machines" and "Communication and electronics" are separate industries, whereas in my data set they are merged to avoid the loss of information when matching to the SIC and NAICS industry classification. The resulting Industry 11-a collection of information and communication technology SIC two-digit industries that are particularly attractive to VC-is a clear outlier that accounts for almost three-quarters of total VC investment over the period. At the other extreme, Industry 3 "Lumber and furniture" which in 2001 saw four times less VC funds than the next lowest industry in terms of VC intensity.
Panel B of Table VII repeats the main OLS and 2SLS regressions after excluding these two industries. Once again, the gist of the results remains largely unchanged. In the preferred instrumental variables regression, variations in VC finance are strongly, significantly, and causally associated with variations in firm size (Column (2)), the share of small firms (Column (4)), the share of medium firms (Column (6)), and the share of large firms Table I for details). Data withheld for confidentiality purposes are reported as "0" in the original file, and are consequently treated as missing observations. "Log VC" is the logarithm of VC investment in a particular state-industry-year. Data on VC investment come from VentureXpert, 1992 VentureXpert, -2001 , and are in constant 2001 dollars. "Industry share of employment" equals the total employment in a given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year. Estimates from OLS regressions (columns labeled "OLS") and from 2SLS regressions (columns labeled "2SLS") where "Log VC" has been instrumented using "Log PF assets Â Pre-1979 VC". The regressions in Panel A exclude all observations from states where the average VC-GDP ratio is lower than 0.001% (Alaska and Hawaii) or higher than 0.1% (California and Massachusetts). The regressions in Panel B exclude all observations from industries 3 and 11. Standard errors, clustered by state-industry, appear below each coefficient in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
(1) (8)). These tests imply that the effect of VC on industry structure is not fully driven by abnormal activity in California and Massachusetts or in the huge computer sector.
VC INVESTMENT TIMING
The evidence so far suggests that more vigorous activity by venture capitalists is associated with a decline in the positive skewness of the firm size distribution in a state-industry pair, and that this effect is not driven by omitted variables, the endogeneity of the VC series, or its high correlation with concurrent developments in other financial markets. One important question that the evidence so far naturally raises is how quickly do changes in VC investment map into the firm size distribution? In particular, it is logical to hypothesize that this effect is not immediate. If VC investment is associated with gestation periods lasting a couple of years, and given that the median age of an IPO issuing firm over 1980-2001 has been in the neighborhood for 5 years (Loughran and Ritter, 2004) , then one would expect lagged values of VC investment to do a better job in explaining variations in, for example, average firm size than contemporaneous ones. Given my empirical approach so far, this fact may remain hidden by aggregation. I investigate this question in Panel A of Table VIII . In terms of my empirical model, I include, in addition to the log of contemporaneous VC investment, two lags of the natural logarithm of VC investment. Although these lagged values are correlated along the investment period, they are not perfectly so: the simple correlation between VC investment at time t and VC investment at time t -2 is 0.60. The evidence is mixed. For example, contemporaneous VC investment explains better the decline in the share of small firms than lagged VC investment (Column (4)). At the same time, the first lag of VC investment explains better the increase in the share of medium-sized firms than contemporaneous VC investment (Column (5)). In both cases, the magnitude of the effect of VC investment on industry structure is lower relative to the estimates reported in Tables V and VI. The second lag of VC does not have a statistical effect on any component of the industry structure. The evidence thus provides only weak support to the hypothesis that given the time response of individual firm growth, the effect of VC on the firm size distribution is not immediate, and that it is important to account explicitly for the slow-moving nature of the employment series.
At the same time, the fact that in some cases contemporaneous VC investment does a better job in explaining changes in the firm size distribution This table reports coefficients from fixed effects OLS and 2SLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the average number of workers per establishment in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Mean establishment size"), the share of establishments with between 1 and 19 employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 1-19 employees"), the share of establishments with between 20 and 99 employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 20-99 employees"), and the share of establishments with 100 or more employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 100 or more employees"). Data on establishments come from the County Business Patterns, 1992-2001. Data coded in SIC for the 1992-97 period and in NAICS for the 1998-2001 period; all data are therefore converted into a SIC-NAICS industrial classification (see Table I for details). Data withheld for confidentiality purposes are reported as "0" in the original file, and are consequently treated as missing observations. "Log VC" is the logarithm of VC investment in a particular state-industry-year. Data on VC investment come from VentureXpert, 1992 VentureXpert, -2001 , and are in constant 2001 dollars. "Industry share of employment" equals the total employment in a given industry-stateyear divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year. Estimates from OLS regressions (columns labeled "OLS") and from 2SLS regressions (columns labeled "2SLS") where "Log VC" has been instrumented using "Log PF assets Â Pre-1979 VC". Panel A include two lags of "Log VC". Panel B includes two leads of "Log VC". Standard errors, clustered by state-industry, appear below each coefficient in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
(1) than, for instance, two-period lagged VC investment suggest that VC investment is indeed partially driven by current market developments. This point is underscored by an analogous set of regressions where instead of two lags of VC investment I add two leads (Panel B of Table VIII ). These tests show that a large portion of the variation in mean establishment size and in the share of small and medium establishments can be attributed to variations in the two-period forward looking measures of VC investment. Clearly, pre-effects exist in that changes in industry structure predict future VC investment. The results in Panels A and B thus provide an immediate justification for the 2SLS approach suggested in Table VI . Of course, these tests may be imperfect if there is a disconnect in the reporting and the disbursement of VC investment.
ERRORS-IN-VARIABLES IN THE VC SERIES
One final concern with the analysis so far is errors-in-variables. The problem is linked to the nature of VC investment. As pointed out by Kortum and Lerner (2000) , the VC disbursements series tends to fluctuate a lot from year to year, partly because a single financing round may be providing funds to be spent over several years. Thus, the venture funding measure is prone to an errors-in-variables problem that might lead to downwardly biased In order to circumvent the potential bias stemming from this problem, I adopt a version of Kortum and Lerner's (2000) proposed technique, namely, computing averages of the logs of each variable over a several year period. As my sample period consist only of 10 years, in order to maximize the timeseries content of the transformed data, I aggregate all variables over 2-year intervals (1992-93, 1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99, 2000-01) . Then I repeat the estimation procedure from before on the aggregated data. Although this strategy allows to eliminate some of the fluctuations of the VC disbursement series, it comes at the expense of lower time variation. In addition, period dummies now capture unobservable time variation over longer periods of time, essentially assuming that any relevant trends common to markets and sectors work their way into the industry structure gradually.
The results of these regressions are reported in Table IX . The main results survive this robustness test. In the case of mean establishment size, the impact of VC increases in magnitude relative to Tables V and VI and is now significant at the 5% level. The coefficients on the establishment's shares imply a somewhat smaller effect, but are close in magnitude to the ones reported in Tables V and VI ; however, the statistical significance of some of the results declines. The estimate thus continues to suggest that the main development in the industry structure resulting from an increase in VC investment is a less pronounced positive skewness of the firm size distribution, even after some of the concerns about the errors-in-variables problem have been alleviated. 
Conclusion
In this article, I set out to investigate the impact of VC on the firm size distribution. Empirically, I study the effect of VC investment on mean establishment size and the relative shares of small, medium-and large-sized establishments in US local markets between 1992 and 2001. I employ in the process an identification strategy that allows me to evaluate differential Table IX . VC investment and industry structure: errors in variables This table reports coefficients from fixed effects OLS and 2SLS regressions, where the dependent variable is the logarithm of the average number of workers per establishment in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Mean establishment size"), the share of establishments with between 1 and 19 employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 1-19 employees"), the share of establishments with between 20 and 99 employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 20-99 employees"), and the share of establishments with between 100 or more employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 100 or more employees"). Data on establishments come from the County Business Patterns, 1992-2001. Data coded in SIC for the 1992-97 period and in NAICS for the 1998-2001 period; all data are therefore converted into a SIC-NAICS industrial classification (see Table I for details). Data withheld for confidentiality purposes are reported as "0" in the original file, and are consequently treated as missing observations. "Log VC" is the logarithm of VC investment in a particular state-industryyear. Data on VC investment come from VentureXpert, 1992 VentureXpert, -2001 , and are in constant 2001 dollars. "Industry share of employment" equals the total employment in a given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year. Estimates from OLS regressions (columns labeled "OLS") and from 2SLS regressions (columns labeled "2SLS") where "Log VC" has been instrumented using "Log PF assets Â Pre-1979 VC". All data are averaged across the 1992-93, 1994-95, 1996-97, 1998-99 , and 2000-01 periods. Standard errors, clustered by state-industry, appear below each coefficient in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) In all specifications employed, I find strong evidence that higher VC investment increases average firm size and reduces the positive skewness of the firm size distribution. These effects are due to a decline in the share of small firms (less than twenty employees) and an increase in the share of mediumsized and larger firms. I find no evidence that this effect is driven by the two states that have been responsible for the bulk of the VC investment in the two decades after 1980-California and Massachusetts-or by the industries that attract most VC funding. My tests also exclude the possibility that the results I find are driven by unobservable factors fixed at the market-sector unit of observations (such as the supply of high-tech ideas by universities in the neighborhood of the Silicon Valley). The estimates remain significant when I use the size of local and state pension funds as an instrument to correct for the endogeneity of VC finance, suggesting a causal link between VC and industry structure. The results remain unchanged when I account for errors-in-variables in the VC series and for the slow-moving nature of the employment series. I argue that these results are broadly consistent with theoretical models of the screening, monitoring, and value-enhancing role of venture capitalists. Given the full extent of the evidence, I interpret the overall results in the sense of the ability of VC finance to enable the emergence of successful firms in possession of large projects. In comparison with bank deregulation, which "democratized" firm entry while leaving the final outcome in the invisible hands of Schumpeterian creative destruction (Kerr and Nanda, 2009) , venture capitalists seem to be actively engaged in the process of picking and nurturing winners.
These findings suggest a number of interesting policy implications. For example, one concern associated with competition-stimulating policies has always been that too much competition could reduce the size and scale of firms, weakening the competitive position of the USA in the world economy. I find such concerns to be unfounded. The picture painted by the results is rather one in which the average firm has grown over time thanks to VC funding. Although the explosion of VC investment in the last 30 years has undoubtedly resulted in more competition in most high-tech markets, by no means has it hurt the ability of these industries to produce viable firms. On the contrary, my estimates suggest that venture capitalists have slowed down an otherwise secular decline in firm size during the 1990s, especially in industries that are at the forefront of today's economy. Although in emerging markets a smaller equilibrium share of small firms is usually indicative of bankers and incumbents working together to erect barriers to entry (Rajan and Zingales, 2003) , a larger equilibrium firm size due to VC finance may be the sign of an increase in product quality. In that sense, VC may have welfare implications that go beyond the scope of this article. (1-3) ) and 2SLS (Columns (4-6)) regressions, where the dependent variable is the share of establishments with between 1 and 19 employees out of all establishments in a particular state-industryyear (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 1-19 employees"), the share of establishments with between 20 and 99 employees in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 20-99 employees"), and the share of establishments with between 20 and 99 employees in a particular state-industry-year (columns labeled "Share of establishments with 1-19 employees"). Data on establishments come from the County Business Patterns, 1992-2001. Data coded in SIC for the 1992-97 period and in NAICS for the 1998-2001 period; all data are therefore converted into a SIC-NAICS industrial classification (see Table I for details). Data withheld for confidentiality purposes are reported as "0" in the original file, and are replaced with the respective stateindustry average or the respective state average if all observations are missing in a particular state-industry. "Log VC" is the logarithm of VC investment in a particular state-industryyear. Data on VC investment come from VentureXpert, 1992 VentureXpert, -2001 , and are in constant 2001 dollars. "Industry share of employment" equals the total employment in a given industry-state-year divided by total employment in the corresponding state-year. Standard errors, clustered by state-industry, appear below each coefficient in parentheses, where *** indicates significance at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level.
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